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Inheriting Dispossession, Mobilizing Vulnerability: Heritage amid Protest in Contemporary Turkey  
 
Abstract  
This article discusses recent Occupy-style protests that took place at sites of heritage quality in Turkey. It 
looks into the material and discursive ways in which the protests have negotiated possession, 
dispossession and belonging across time. Cultural heritage is more often than not understood as a 
‘thing’ belonging to a particular proprietor (regardless of heritage’s intangibility or the proprietor’s 
collectivity or anonymity). It is regulated as such not just on the level of nation-states but also globally. 
The examples discussed in this article, however, have seen much of this association thrown into disarray 
by shifting focus, instead, to vulnerability and dispossession. This shift of focus invokes the following two 
forces: (1) the violent pasts and their role in the production of ‘cultural heritage’ as such, and (2) the risk 
of earthquake and its prompting of negotiations over the use, ownership and physical layout of 
heritage-quality sites. What sorts of political agency might heritage enable when it is experienced and 
conceptualized through vulnerability and dispossession? What might such experience and 
conceptualization mean for the temporalities and human–nonhuman hierarchy associated with 
conventional understandings of belonging in and through heritage? The article explores these questions 
through two cases: Gezi Park and its environs in Istanbul, and the Tigris Valley (including Hewsel Gardens 
and Mount Kırklar) in Diyarbakır.  
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The official ways in which heritage is regulated and managed have intimately linked it to proprietorship. 
Cultural policies on both national and global scales implicate heritage as a property that embodies the 
culture possessed by a collectivity (whether ‘the nation’ or ‘humanity’) that is imagined as an 
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individual proprietor.1 As Tunbridge and Ashworth have shown, ‘heritage is someone’s heritage and 
therefore logically not someone else’s: the original meaning of an inheritance implies the existence of 
disinheritance and, by extension, any creation of heritage from the past disinherits someone completely 
or partially, actively or potentially’.2 Heritage, then, is inherently exclusionary. Yet the very mechanism 
of exclusion that underpins heritage also defines today the lived experience of a growing part of the 
world’s population. Precarious working conditions, radical alterations in the use, disposition and physical 
layout of built and natural environments in both rural and urban areas, climate change and armed 
conflict across the globe, operate in interrelated ways to exclude ever greater numbers of people from 
experiencing safety and security for increasingly longer periods of time.3 While this exclusion has not 
been altogether caused by but has only crystallized due to events in this century,4 the social reaction to 
it has recently become more visibly unified and consolidated in the particular form of bodily assembly in 
public space that is now widely known as Occupy-style protest.5 Since 2013, Turkey has seen such 
protest take place in sites listed, nominated and/or considered as heritage by different actors, where 
the heritage quality associated with each site has become entangled with the various kinds of exclusion 
confronted by the protesters.  
Studying this entanglement, I question the intimate link between proprietorship and heritage, 
focusing especially on questions concerning temporality and human–nonhuman relations whose 
conventional understandings have been key to this link. The recent protests in Turkey constitute a 
pertinent case study due not only to the global context of contemporary Occupy-style protests, but also 
to an aspect of the local/national context, namely the long- standing and across-the-board currency of 
sentiments associated with social exclusion and marginalization, such as victimhood and vulnerability, in 
the political arena.6 The appeal of these sentiments is so wide that not just the opposition or 
representatives of rights-seeking communities, but also dominant political actors, such as those who 
have governed Turkey over the years, have mobilized them. The latter have most recently been 
represented by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; in English: Justice and Development Party), who 
have been in government since November 2002.7 A study of the ways in which contemporary protest 
negotiates heritage’s entanglement with social exclusion therefore, becomes all the more compelling in 
a case where the self-perception of marginalization is neither necessarily based on a lack of access to 
sociopolitical influence nor the preserve of those who express dissent against the political 
establishment, such as Occupy-style protesters. I argue that the recent protests in Turkey have 
mobilized, rather than just combated, the exclusionary nature of heritage, challenging dispossession’s 
associations with disempowerment, agency deprivation and political immobilization. This calls for a 
close and nuanced examination of the myriad relations between belonging and heritage, not all of which 
adhere to the conventions that underpin proprietorship-based understandings of heritage – especially 
those concerning the actors and temporalities involved in heritage production, use and management.  
Inheriting Dispossession  
The public protests that erupted in Istanbul in the summer of 2013 were in many ways underpinned by 
competing notions of heritage.8 Gezi Park, the epicentre of the protests, is part of a larger urban 
heritage site.9 The bulldozer 
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that triggered the protests by attempting to uproot trees in the park was part of a government-
endorsed redevelopment of Gezi and the neighbouring Taksim Square. This redevelopment was 
expected to include the reconstruction of a nineteenth-century military barracks demolished in the 
1940s to make way for the park. Members of the government described the barracks as ‘historical 
heritage’10 and indeed officially listed it as such in 2012.11 Once reconstructed, it would reportedly serve 
as a luxury residential and retail complex.12 The protesters, who gathered on May 27 to stop the works 
and occupied Gezi until June 15 when the park was finally and forcibly evacuated, included members of 
Nor Zartonk, a group of activists drawn from Turkey’s Armenian community. The latter were subject to 
various episodes of organized and state-endorsed violence, dispossession and displacement in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a process that culminated in the Armenian Genocide of 1915. 
Nor Zartonk’s protest tents were accompanied by symbolic gravestones made of Styrofoam [Figure 1] 
that referred to their heritage and read, ‘You took away our cemetery but you will not be able to take 
away our park!’ The slogan referred to the Armenian cemetery that used to be located just across the 
street from Gezi Park until the 1940s, when it began to be gradually taken over by buildings significant 
to the then-burgeoning nation-state project, including the state radio headquarters, a social club for 
military personnel, and some of Istanbul’s first luxury hotels [Figure 2].13 
In their fieldnotes on the Gezi protests, Alice von Bieberstein and Nora Tataryan consider Nor 
Zartonk’s intervention in light of Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou’s conversations on 
dispossession.14 Butler and Athanasiou speak of two distinct notions of dispossession that pertain to 
justice-seeking activism. The first concerns ‘the predicament of being moved by what one sees, feels, 
and comes to know’, in turn to ‘find oneself transported […] into a social world in which one is not the 
center’.15 It is this sort of dispossession, the scholars suggest, which prompts one to act and resist 
together with others to bring injustice to an end. What often underpins the injustice in question 
indicates Butler and Athanasiou’s second notion of dispossession: ‘the systematic dispossession of 
peoples through forced migration, unemployment, homelessness, occupation, and conquest’.16 The 
crucial question, for the scholars, is how to mobilize the first sort of dispossession towards collectively 
opposing the second. Their response builds on a rethinking of the experience of vulnerability that so 
often accompanies dispossession. According to Butler and Athanasiou, vulnerability has become so 
prevalent an experience today as to call for a shift in the way it is understood: from a disempowering 
deprivation into a common ground from which to seek new political alliances. In their words:  
[T]here must be another way to enact vulnerability, without becoming socially dead from 
political destitution or subjecting others to a life of social death. This other way to live requires 
[…] a world in which collective means are found to protect […] vulnerability without precisely 
eradicating it.17  
There are at least two instances in which certain groups of actors have related the early-
twentieth-century restructuring of the park and its environs as having led to dispossession. The first 
concerns the nineteenth-century military barracks, which the governing authorities have wanted to 
rebuild 
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Figure 1: Nor Zartonk’s symbolic gravestones set up at Gezi Park, June 2013. 
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Figure 2: Satellite image indicating the former Armenian cemetery (blue) and military barracks (pink) in 
relation to today’s Gezi Park and its environs. 
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as a prime example of what they have called ‘ancestors’ heirloom’.18 The second instance involves the 
former Armenian cemetery whose memory is cherished by the Nor Zartonk activists. However, the way 
each group have dealt with past dispossession in the present is radically divergent. Consider the 
heritage-listing of the barracks, and its in situ reconstruction to serve as an exclusive asset and a space 
of consumption that would boost a particular idea of economic development.19 These amount to a tit-
for-tat strategy of overcoming vulnerability at the expense of inflicting new vulnerabilities on others. 
Nor Zartonk’s symbolic gravestones, on the other hand, did not demand a physical restoration of the 
past but drew an analogy between the community’s historical dispossession of the cemetery and other 
sorts of dispossession likely to occur in this part of town due to its potential redevelopment by the 
authorities. The latter approach, then, is a mobilization of vulnerability rather than its annihilation, and a 
prompting of the convergence between one’s own vulnerability and that of others. Also noteworthy in 
this respect are the materiality and aesthetics of Nor Zartonk’s intervention. The Styrofoam of which the 
symbolic gravestone was made, and the physical changes this material afforded over the course of the 
protests, stand in stark contrast to the illusion of permanence that characterizes many an officially 
endorsed architectural enterprise of heritage production, such as the barracks. The intervention could 
therefore be argued to have mobilized vulnerability not just discursively but also materially.  
Mobilizing Vulnerability Through Heritage in Multiple Directions Across Time  
Taking the past literally versus considering it analogically to the present, and pursuing permanence 
versus employing temporariness: the differences between these approaches draw attention to the role 
of temporality in negotiating dispossession. I would like to attend to this role by way of Sarah Keenan’s 
concept of ‘subversive property’.20 This concept, as Keenan has explained, concerns less ‘the 
proper(tied) subject’ than an ever-changing relation of belonging ‘held up by the surrounding space’, 
which can form ‘between a part and a whole’ as well as ‘between a subject and an object’.21 In 
developing this concept, Keenan has rethought the temporal underpinnings of conventional 
understandings of property. In her words: Property produces linear time by contouring space such that 
particular objects and bodies (or, objects and bodies coming from a particular trajectory) are likely to 
continue on in their position in the future.22 […] Subversive property disrupts the linear time produced 
by hegemonic networks of belonging. Through introducing things that do not belong or bodies that are 
not properly oriented, subversive property interferes with the long alignment of braided durations that 
constitute the proprietal link between past, present and future.23 As indicated in the previous section, in 
Gezi the barracks project has been characterized by a linear structuring of national time, insofar as the 
authorities wish to see a nineteenth-century building be morphologically teleported to the twenty-first 
century and serve a particular idea of economic progress. Nor Zartonk’s intervention, however, 
highlighted not only the fact that progress is selective, as it requires the exclusion of certain social 
groups, but also that 
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such exclusions are manifold and ongoing. In so doing, it aimed to weave a temporally multidirectional 
network upheld by the space of Gezi Park to bring together those left out at various points along what 
dominant narratives may implicate as the nation’s progress.24 Nonlinearity, moreover, characterizes also 
the intervention’s methodology itself. This methodology challenges the idea that, in justice-seeking 
activism through heritage, the relation between the dispossession and (re)possession of heritage-as-
property need always be construed as a binary opposition and thus as a teleological trajectory, which 
ought to progress from dispossession to (re)possession.25 Alongside the linear time of national progress, 
there are two further sorts of temporality to consider when discussing Gezi in light of dispossession. One 
of these is of a scale below national time, and the other, above. The first one pertains to day-to-day 
interaction and succession, which Michael Herzfeld has called ‘social time’.26 The second temporality 
concerns the impending Istanbul earthquake,27 which could be considered an example of ‘planetary 
time’.28 The reason why these two temporalities were at work in Gezi has to do with the comprehensive 
and legally stipulated physical transformation of urban Turkey that has been underway since 2012. May 
16 that year saw the passing of ‘the Law (no. 6306) on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk’ 
(henceforth referred to by its more popular agnomen ‘the Disaster Law’), which purportedly aimed at 
disaster-proofing the country’s building stock. A detailed discussion of this law is beyond the scope of 
this article.29 But suffice it to say that the Disaster Law’s definition of purview is so expansive as to be 
able to potentially subject any acre in Turkey to redevelopment, since the law has implications for not 
just the buildings and areas it designates as ‘risky’ but also the zones it identifies as ‘safe’ for new 
settlement.30 The Disaster Law has therefore been criticized for serving government-endorsed 
‘ideological, political and economic interests’, such as the centralization of power, spatial redistribution 
of urban populations, managing of conflicts in cities, and reorganization of land-based interest groups.31 
Moreover, the law has implications for the everyday lives of millions, as flat owners whose property is 
located in a building or area subject to redevelopment under the Disaster Law are left with two choices: 
either to have their property expropriated if they refuse to agree with fellow residents or neighbours on 
the terms of their building’s transformation; or, to engage in intense negotiation, surveying and market 
study to try and stretch those terms as much as possible.32 
According to Donna Houston, disasters cause planetary time and social time to overlap one 
another; whereas these events are often taken for granted as belonging to a domain above and beyond 
ordinary people’s lives (whether to the objective world of hard science or to the metaphysical realm of 
the divine), when they do take place, the fact that they are experienced in vastly uneven ways by 
different social groups renders explicit their sociopolitical character.33 It is this sort of overlap upon 
which Houston has built her notion of ‘environmental justice for the Anthropocene, [...] a project that 
materially and imaginatively situates environmental crisis in everyday terms, as some- thing that we live 
with and strive to transform’.34 The Disaster Law and its consequences, however, demonstrate the 
flipside to this conflation of planetary time and social time. The law’s triggering a radical restructuring of 
the city on the grounds of earthquake risk may have proponed and protracted, through architectural 
means, the folding and unfolding of material space that would otherwise be caused instantly and in an 
unknown future by tectonic plates [Figure 3].35 But this quantitative conflation of planetary and 
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Figure 3: A view of Fikirtepe, one of the most intensely transformed areas of Istanbul under the Disaster 
Law, April 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tents in the Gezi Park protests, June 2013. 
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social time has remained devoid of the qualitative counterpart required for a project such as Donna 
Houston’s. 36 Its political potential has been channelled into a teleological structuring of time through 
property, whether in the form of government-endorsed narratives of a safer Turkey,37 or in that of 
private struggles, ambitions and visions for capital accumulation.38  
However, the Gezi protests, which took place at a time when the Disaster Law’s physical and 
social impact had already begun to materialize, saw an altogether different mobilization of the risk of 
disaster. Foremost among the reasons why the protesters wanted to stop the bulldozers was the fact 
that the park is one of the last remaining green spaces in Istanbul’s touristic and cultural centre, and, in 
that, the only site that can serve as an emergency assembly area and field hospital in the case of the 
earthquake that is said to be imminent in Istanbul.39 The contradiction between the government’s 
endorsement of the Disaster Law and their hostility towards Gezi was obvious to an activist, a 
photographer in her late twenties, who remarked that ‘they are great at abusing the risk of earthquake 
for gentrification but oblivious to how indispensable places like Gezi are in times of disaster’.40 According 
to another protester, a commercial agent in his early thirties, ‘people proved in Gezi that, in case of 
disaster, they’re likely to organize much better than the state’.41 Another activist, a high school teacher 
in his early forties, remarked that, 
the tents and the solidarity in Gezi reminded me of August the 17th [the 7.6-magnitude 
earthquake of 1999 in north-western Turkey]. […] Also, we saw, and showed, how vital such a 
place is in case of disaster, and how it can serve to shelter thousands.42  
The General Secretary of the Istanbul Branch of the Turkish Association of Architects, Mücella Yapıcı, 
who was among the protesters, drew a similar analogy when she said of the protests, ‘in fact we were 
using the park as if to carry out an earthquake drill’ [Figure 4].43 Not only does this sort of incorporation 
of the planetary within the everyday mobilize, rather than seek to overcome, vulnerability; it also 
envisages the human–nonhuman dynamics involved in relations of belonging as one of mutual 
dependence rather than a hierarchy of people above artefacts, which reduces the latter to passive tools 
of capital accumulation along a linear temporal trajectory.44  
Rethinking the Conventions of Proprietorship-based Heritage  
What forms of belonging other than those that involve a hierarchy between human and nonhuman 
actors could be enabled, then, by negotiating heritage through dispossession? I would like to explore 
this question through a second case from contemporary Turkey: that of the Tigris Valley in the south-
eastern city of Diyarbakır. This city is the heartland of the northern quarter of the sociopolitical 
geography of Kurdistan that is scattered across four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.45 Since the 
mid-1980s, northern Kurdistan (or south-eastern Turkey)46 has been the setting of intense armed conflict 
between the Kurdistan Workers Party (known by the Kurdish-language initials ‘PKK’) and the Turkish 
Armed Forces. While throughout the 1980s and 1990s the PKK sought to establish an independent 
Kurdish nation-state through military offensive, over the past decade 
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they have shifted to pursuing, through self-defence, a project of democratic autonomy within a federal 
Republic of Turkey.47 In 2009, the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the state started unofficial 
peace talks accompanied by a truce, constituting what was popularly known as ‘the resolution 
process’,48 which came to a halt in summer 2015 as the armed conflict began anew.49  
This process between 2009 and 2015, which decelerated violence in Turkey’s south-east, also 
made a substantial impact on the built environment. Using the cease-fire as an opportunity to 
consolidate both military and civilian infrastructure, the state embarked on a set of projects, including 
high-security military outposts dubbed kalekol (‘castle-station’), hydropower dams and airports.50 But 
new construction activity in the region was not limited to state-sponsored projects. In Diyarbakır, where 
I carried out research in 2012, most controversial among the new projects was a private housing estate 
atop Mount Kırklar in the Tigris Valley [Figure 5]. The name of this hill comes from the number forty (in 
Turkish: kırk) and refers to the forty Christian saints in whose memory a church is believed to have been 
built here in the fifth century.51 Mount Kırklar has, therefore, long been considered sacred in Diyarbakır, 
but all the more so by Syriac Christians, a community whose local population has significantly decreased 
after successive episodes of violence, forced migration and dispossession from the late nineteenth 
century onwards.52 The controversy around this housing project was heightened due to the diversity of 
the stakeholders involved, who included not 
 
 
Figure 5: The Mount Kırklar estate, July 2012. 
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just the sort of people the local dissidents have come to identify as adversaries, such as retired military 
personnel and businessmen with close ties to the state, but also actors from the pro-Kurdish political 
movement, such as the municipality (who after all had to authorize the construction) and people 
affiliated with the PKK.53 At one point during my fieldwork it was even rumoured, perhaps to boost pre-
sales, that Abdullah Öcalan would move to this estate as soon as he was freed at the end of the 
resolution process. I also observed that the Mount Kırklar project had begun to cause internal conflict 
within the pro-Kurdish movement. This was evidenced most significantly by a critical investigation into 
the housing project, conducted and written by a journalist working for the pro-Kurdish media agency 
ANF News, which was censored almost immediately after being published on the agency’s website.54 
Two important developments regarding the Tigris Valley took place in 2013. First, it was nominated as a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site. Soon after the nomination, however, the state opened the valley to 
potential redevelopment under the Disaster Law.55 This catalyzed the construction activity in the area 
that was already underway, such as the building of an upscale restaurant and an attempt to restructure 
the centuries-old swathe of agricultural land, called Hewsel Gardens (in Kurdish: Baxçeyên Hewselê) – 
just across the river from Mount Kırklar – [Figure 6] as a ‘recreational area’.56  
As the medium of violence shifted – from armed conflict between two clearly defined camps, to 
environmental destruction by architectural construction, whose stakeholders crisscrossed the political 
spectrum – voices  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Hewsel Gardens against the background of Mount Kırklar, September 2014. 
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of opposition began to be raised much more loudly in late 2013. Local activists protested at the Mount 
Kırklar estate and the nearby luxury restaurant, likening these developments to the military outposts 
that the state has been building elsewhere in the region.57 Similar analogies were also drawn at a three-
week Occupy-style protest that took place in Hewsel Gardens and referenced the Gezi events of a few 
months back.58 Many of the protesters, as well as politicians from across the political spectrum, who 
acknowledged the damage done by construction activity in the Tigris Valley, suggested that supporting 
the valley’s World Heritage Site bid required the demolition of projects like the Mount Kırklar flats.59 
Conversely, the members of an eco- activist group named Bûka Baranê (Kurdish for ‘the Bride of Rain’), 
who also participated in related protests, developed a proposal to preserve the flats for use as ecological 
villages to house Diyarbakır’s urban poor and its refugees from the neighbouring war-torn Syria. This 
proposal was underpinned not only by the idea that demolition is as unjustly lucrative and 
environmentally harmful a process as construction, but also by a materialist genealogy of the project. In 
their spokesperson’s own words:  
The urban-ecological damage caused by the project is irreversible: sand was quarried from the 
sandpits in the Tigris Valley that have verged on eradicating the valley’s habitat; cement was 
produced by carving into the region’s mountains and polluting its air; iron, ceramics, copper, 
and aluminium were extracted from the area and transported into the construction site by 
carbon-emitting trucks; all of these materials were channeled into construction through a 
labour-intensive process. Demolishing the flats will not only lay waste to all of these raw 
materials and labour, but will also create a huge radioactive landfill – and will do so before the 
eyes of hundreds of homeless citizens and refugees.60 
Those seeking to protect the valley’s heritage quality – by likening the flats to military outposts and 
demanding their demolition – maintained at least two conventions inherent to proprietorship-based 
belonging. The first convention concerns the linearity of temporality: demanding to demolish the flats 
and thus to retract what has happened is a movement in time that is no less linear than development 
and construction. The second one has to do with the human–nonhuman hierarchy: comparing flats to 
outposts places them within a long-standing human power struggle, and therefore assumes that the 
significance of belonging is limited to human inhabitants. In proposing to preserve the flats, Bukâ 
Baranê, on the other hand, envisaged this significance to play out in multiple directions across time and 
in ways that do not necessarily involve humans. Their materialist genealogy of the estate demonstrates 
that the flats belong in the valley. The activists’ demand that the estate be employed to accommodate 
the urban poor and refugees, asserts that the flats also belong to those in direst need. In short, Bukâ 
Baranê sought to mobilize the political potential of belonging by treating the latter as a relationship that 
unfolds across planetary time, as well as social time, and among non-living matter as well as between 
people and things. 
Conclusion  
The recent protests that erupted in two of Turkey’s heritage-quality sites mobilized particular processes 
of dispossession in order to lay claims on material space. These processes did not reaffirm the linear 
relationship 
371 
 
between dispossession and (re)possession, nor did they assume a relationship between heritage as 
property owned by a particular proprietor. Rather than pursue an unconditional idea of proprietorship-
as-belonging, the protests mobilized vulnerability and exclusion in multiple directions across time. This 
mobilization has important implications for the dualisms whose conventional understandings underpin 
heritage-as-proprietorship, such as possession versus dispossession; security versus vulnerability; and 
humans versus nonhumans. It demonstrates that, in an increasingly volatile age, the taken-for-granted 
hierarchies involved in these dualisms – especially the strict association of political agency with only the 
first half of each dualism – ought to be rethought as temporally and spatially contingent.  
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